Iran is undertaking a broad reorganisation of its military and security structures, increasing the production of missiles and unmanned aircraft and preparing capabilities that could allow operations beyond its own territory. Recent information indicates that Tehran is treating the current situation as part of a potentially prolonged confrontation with the United States.
The preparations come amid continuing military tensions, U.S. naval pressure and disputes surrounding shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Reports based on Iranian and Arab officials and intelligence assessments suggest that Tehran has been using periods of reduced fighting to rebuild and restructure its military capabilities.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, is central to the process. The organisation has approximately 200,000 personnel and remains one of the main structures responsible for Iran’s missile capabilities, operations outside the country and relations with allied armed groups across the Middle East.
One of the most significant developments is increased production of ballistic missiles and drones. Iranian military officials say periods of lower-intensity fighting have been used to replenish stocks, accelerate production and improve weapon accuracy. This is particularly important because parts of Iran’s missile infrastructure suffered substantial damage during American and Israeli strikes.
Changes are also taking place within the command structure. IRGC veterans and commanders with experience from previous conflicts are being placed in important positions, with the objective of improving coordination between different branches of the armed forces. The role of the Basij paramilitary organisation is also being strengthened, including in intelligence and internal security.
The concern is not limited to external military threats. Tehran fears that future attacks could be accompanied by intelligence operations and domestic unrest. Previous strikes revealed significant vulnerabilities in Iran’s security system and demonstrated the ability of its adversaries to obtain information about military facilities and senior commanders.
At the same time, Iran continues to maintain relationships with allied armed groups across the region. IRGC personnel have been linked to coordination activities in Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon. Yemen is particularly important because the Houthis possess missiles, drones and other systems capable of threatening shipping in the Red Sea and around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The geography of a potential escalation therefore extends well beyond the Persian Gulf. Hormuz remains the central strategic point, but the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb are increasingly important as well.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important energy corridors. Under normal conditions, roughly one-fifth of globally traded oil and petroleum products passes through the route. Any sustained disruption therefore has consequences far beyond the Middle East.
Recent figures illustrate the decline in traffic. During one recent weekend, only five ships passed through Hormuz on Saturday and none on Sunday, compared with 31 vessels during the previous weekend.
Energy markets have responded to the uncertainty. On August 17, Brent crude reached approximately $89.40 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate traded around $82.83. Both benchmarks had risen by more than 5% during the previous week.
The United States says it is prepared to maintain naval pressure on Iran through the rotation of military forces. Washington is simultaneously using economic measures, including additional sanctions, to increase pressure on Tehran.
American forces have also continued operations against Iranian military infrastructure. Recent targets have included command centres, missile- and drone-related facilities, coastal surveillance systems and other military installations. Iran, in turn, has used missiles and unmanned systems against American and associated targets.
Tehran is also examining scenarios for a possible expansion of the conflict. Options reportedly considered include operations against communications, military and energy infrastructure and retaliatory attacks against territories that Iran believes are being used to support operations against it.
This places the Gulf states in a particularly difficult position. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and other countries are attempting to avoid direct involvement, but their territories contain strategically important military and energy infrastructure.
Diplomatic efforts are continuing but have not yet produced a decisive breakthrough. Oman remains an important mediator, including in efforts to find a solution concerning shipping through Hormuz. As of August 17, however, there is no decision on a full resumption of direct U.S.-Iran negotiations.
Differences also exist within Iran’s leadership. President Masoud Pezeshkian and more pragmatic figures have warned about the economic consequences of prolonged conflict and sanctions. Hardline elements of the establishment, however, appear to be preparing the country for the possibility of a long confrontation.
This does not necessarily mean that Tehran has already decided to launch a new large-scale war. Part of the military preparation may serve a deterrent purpose – demonstrating to the United States, Israel and regional governments that further attacks against Iran would carry a high price.
Nevertheless, the combination of increased missile and drone production, changes in military command, stronger internal-security structures and activity among regional allies indicates that Iran is preparing for the possibility of a prolonged confrontation.
The greatest risk is that the conflict could spread to additional countries, military bases, ports and energy infrastructure across the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Given the strategic importance of Hormuz, the consequences are no longer exclusively regional and could affect oil prices, shipping and the wider global economy.
